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e have all heard it said that if we don’t learn from history, we are condemned to repeat it.  It appears that we, 
as the accounting profession, failed to learn from the Continental Vending case that occurred about four 
decades ago and thus repeated our mistakes in the Enron case.  First, we will give a brief review of the basics 
of the Continental Vending case since few of us seem to remember it. 
 
Quoting directly from Montgomery’s Auditing, 10th edition, copyright 1984: 
 
This case was a criminal action against the auditors of Continental Vending for having made 
a false and misleading statement under the 1934 Act by having inappropriately issued an unqualified 
opinion.  A major issue was the wording of the disclosure, in a footnote to the financial statements, of 
loan transactions involving the audited company, an affiliate, and an officer of the company.  The 
government contended that the disclosure was inadequate because it did not state that amounts 
receivable from the affiliate were uncollectible at the balance sheet date nor did it specify the nature 
of the collateral, which was shares of the client’s own stock.  The auditors’ defense was that the 
statements were in compliance with GAAP, which they maintained, indicated that they had not 
intended to deceive.  The judge instructed the jury, however, that the critical test was whether the 
financial statements, as a whole, fairly presented the company’s financial position and results of 
operations.  Following those instructions, the jury found the defendants guilty.  
 
The case was appealed to the second circuit which refused to reverse the decision.  The 
major issue in the appellate decision written by Judge Friendly was whether the auditors had acted in 
good faith in not disclosing information that they were aware of but that was not required by GAAP-
essentially in the form of published authoritative pronouncements-to be disclosed. 
 
1.0  What We Should Have Learned From Continental Vending 
 
It seems clear to these authors that the lesson that the profession should have learned almost four decades ago 
was that when we state “fairly presented...in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles” we are making 
two statements rather than one statement.  However, that is not how the profession seems to have been using that 
statement.  It appears that the profession has believed that as long as we can somehow shoehorn our presentation into 
GAAP, we can claim fair presentation regardless of how unclear and difficult to understand that it might be to the lay 
reader. 
 
2.0  One Of The Author’s Personal Experiences 
 
When I (Mano) was in Lincoln, Nebraska, while working on my Ph.D. I obtained a copy of the annual report of 
Con Agra Corporation.  Con Agra is an agribusiness corporation headquartered in Omaha, Nebraska.  The company was 
audited by what was then Coopers & Lybrand (now PricewaterhouseCoopers) and their auditors’ opinion was included in 
the annual report.  It was a standard “unqualified” opinion which purports that the financial statements are fairly 
presented, in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, and thus implying full disclosure.  As I read the 
annual report, I came across a footnote which I simply did not understand.  The footnote related to taxes and I don’t claim  
___________________ 
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to be a tax expert but I do claim to have a pretty good basic understanding of taxes.  After reading the footnote several 
times and being completely baffled, I went to visit a professor named Richard Johnson who is a CPA, an attorney, a truly 
brilliant person, and whom I consider to be a genuine tax expert. 
 
Rick read the footnote over several times and confessed that he did not understand it.  He told me that he had an 
uncle who worked for Con Agra in the accounting function.  Rick offered to call his uncle and ask him what the footnote 
meant.  I asked Rick to do so.  A few days later, I visited Rick in his office and asked him if he had called his uncle.  Rick 
said that he had.  I asked him what his uncle had said.  Rick told me that his uncle had said, “It’s none of your damn 
business!”    I must assume that Con Agra was somehow trying to disclose what they were required to disclose but for 
some reason did not want the general public, a non-tax accounting professor, a genuine tax expert, nor even a relative to 
know what it really meant.  Coopers & Lybrand had given the entire financial statements their stamp of approval even 
though they were probably fully aware that they were incomprehensible to anyone who would read them. 
 
3.0  That Was Then (1978); This Is Now 
 
As information about Enron debacle began to unfold, we read an article that appeared in the November 5, 2001 
Wall Street Journal titled, “Andersen Faces Scrutiny on Clarity of Enron Disclosures.”  That article discusses how parts 
of the Enron annual report are “indecipherable.”  The article quotes Karen Denne, a spokesperson for Enron.  In one part, 
she states that if anyone does not understand the financial statements all they need to do is ask.  Judging from other 
statements made in the article which are attributed to Ms. Denne, we must assume that if we were to ask, her answer 
might be very similar to the response received from Rick Johnson’s uncle in the Con Agra case.  In another part of the 
article she tries to defend the quality of the financial statements by saying, “They comply with reporting requirements.” 
Ms. Denne does not seem to seem to recall the Continental Vending case.  She then continues with this appalling 
statement, “...investors who didn’t understand the transactions didn’t have to buy Enron stock.”  Wow, what a way to 
justify a lack of full disclosure!!!    In the same article, Douglas Carmichael, an accounting professor at Baruch College in 
New York, said of the disclosures, “The raw numbers may all be there.  But any objective person would be hard pressed 
to understand the effects of these disclosures on the financial statements.”  Although Professor Carmichael’s comment is 
aimed specifically at Enron, it could just as well be aimed at Con Agra (and perhaps many more companies) as well. 
 
Exactly one week later, on November 12, 2001, there was another article on Enron titled, “Basic Principle of 
Accounting Tripped Enron.”  The article began by stating, “What could Arthur Andersen have done to protect the 
investing public from Enron?  Brushing up on a basic accounting textbook might have helped…”  The article states that 
portions of Enron’s accounting practices amounted to violations of elementary accounting principles.  The article then 
quotes former SEC Chief Accountant, Lynn Turner who asks, “How did both partners and the manager on this audit miss 
this simple Accounting 101 rule?”  Since it was so simple, these authors can only assume that it was intentional rather 
than erroneous.  We hope that the fact that Enron paid Andersen $25 million for the audit and $27 million for other 
services did not have an impact on Andersen auditors’ judgment.  Unfortunately, these authors’ suspicious minds make us 
suspect that all of those dollars actually did have an impact. 
 
Exactly one month after the first Enron article referenced above, another Enron article appeared in the 
December 5, 2001 Wall Street Journal.   That article stated, “The company (Enron) hired legions of lawyers and 
accountants to help it meet the letter of federal securities laws while trampling on the intent of those laws.  It became 
adept at giving technically correct answers rather than simply honest ones.”   Again, it appears that Enron people did not 
recall Continental Vending and thus repeated the same mistakes.  We accountants must resist any temptation to become 
involved in such fraudulent financial reporting.  Fraudulent financial reporting is of no value in our society.  We need to 
be the protectors of financial reporting integrity or this profession is of no value in our society. 
 
4.0  Conclusion 
 
Enron auditors seem to have failed to learn from the Continental Vending case.  If all auditors fail to learn from 
the Enron case, we are likely to see a case similar to Enron occur again in about 2040, or even sooner.  Let’s not let it 
happen!   
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A table comparing Enron and Continental Vending: 
 
Enron and Continental Vending: A Comparison 
Continental Vending Enron 
Criminal charges 
Continental Vending was the first case in which auditors were 
charged criminally for a failed audit. 
Enron is the first case in which an accounting firm was indicted on 
criminal charges. 
What was the issue? 
They overstated the Owners’ Equity. They understated liabilities and thus overstated the Owners’ Equity. 
How did they do it? 
In Continental Vending, the issue was a receivable between 
Continental Vending and Valley Mortgage which was collateralized 
by Continental Vending stock.  Both Continental and Valley had the 
same owners.  When Continental stock decreased in value, the 
receivable became worthless. 
In Enron, the issue is Special Purpose Entities which were essentially 
all owned by Enron but not included in the Enron financial 
statements.  There were liabilities in the Special Purpose Entities 
which should have been reported by Enron but were not. 
What is the accounting term for that? 
The accounting profession created a new term for it.  It is called 
“Related Party Transactions.” 
Again, we are talking about “Related Party Transactions.” 
Did the auditor Know? 
The Continental Vending auditors never claimed to be unaware of 
the accounting methods being employed. 
The Enron auditors never have claimed to have been unaware of the 
accounting methods being employed. 
What about full disclosure? 
The judge in this case held that the profession must be held to a 
higher standard than GAAP....The message was that auditors should 
evaluate the probable effect of disclosures on stockholders’ 
investment decisions, and if the disclosures are likely to affect such 
decisions, disclosure is appropriate, regardless of GAAP’s 
requirements. 
It appears that the court will state essentially the same things as it 
said in Continental Vending.  The profession is already reacting to 
implement standards which would have required disclosure by Enron 
had they been effective months ago. 
History of stock prices of the companies 
March 22, 1961           $18.50 (All time high) 
March 15, 1962           $10.625 
February 26, 1963       $2.50 
February 27, 1963    Suspended by Amex and                                  
SEC 
August 31, 2000         $84.88 
August 31, 2001         $34.99 
November 30, 2001    $0.26 
July 31, 2002        $0.11(over the counter) 
Stock prices after disclosure of irregularities 
Continental Vending stock which had a market value of $2,978,000 
on February 15, 1963 was pledged as collateral for the Valley 
Commercial Corporation loan.  That stock dropped in value to 
$395,000 ten days later and two days before the government 
padlocked the plant and the American Stock Exchange suspended 
trading of Continental stock.  (Rittenberg & Schwieger, Auditing, 
page 152) 
It is well documented that Enron stock suffered a dramatic and 
sudden decrease from its historic high of about $90 per share to $.25 
per share just before the bankruptcy was announced. 
 
The adequacy of footnote disclosures 
The judge in the Continental Vending case said, “The jury could 
reasonably have wondered how accountants who were really seeking 
to tell the truth could have constructed a footnote so well designed to 
conceal the shocking facts.”   (Rittenberg & Schwieger, Auditing, 
page 153)  
On November 5, 2001, the Wall Street Journal reported that, “Many 
Wall Street analysts, including die-hard Enron bulls, long have 
grumbled that parts of Enron’s financial statements are 
indecipherable.” 
 
Table continued on next page. 
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Table Continued: 
 
Misleading comments made by lead executive prior to disclosure or irregularities 
Harold Roth, President and Chairman: 
Wall Street Journal, February 21, 1962 
 
“I have every reason to believe that 1962 will continue to show as 
great improvement (as the year before), and will be the first of many 
years of spectacular growth.” 
 
Regarding the first four months of 1962: “Our sales have been going 
according to our plans, our earnings have been holding up well.” 
Kenneth Lay: CEO and Chairman 
Business 2.0: March, 2002 
 
“Our performance has never been stronger; our business model has 
never been more robust; our growth has never been more certain...”  
(From Kenneth Lay, in an e-mail to all employees, August 14, 2001). 
Significance of the client to the auditor 
The difference here is striking.  Continental was not the kind of 
client whose size would give it leverage to bully a great accounting 
firm.  It was even reported that Continental had become a 
considerable headache to Lybrand (Journal of Accountancy, 
February, 1970, page 67). 
Enron was a significant client.  It was the seventh largest corporation 
in the world and the second largest client of Andersen. 
 
Notes 
